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“By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind—the air, running 
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, scientists have predicted that human-caused climate change will 
make natural disasters more extreme and commonplace.2 Everyone contributes to 
climate change, but an ascertainable few have done far more to stifle debate, slow 
the switch to alternative energy, and raise global temperatures, making them the 
ideal defendants for the impending wave of climate change litigation.3 
These ideal defendants, collectively referred to here as “Carbon Majors,” have 
been so successful that in 2019, the United States is still heavily subsidizing their 
operations and refusing to respond in a rational way to climate change.4 Given that 
the “point of no return” is either imminent or has already passed,5 and the U.S. 
 
1.  J. INST. 2.1.1. 
2. Current Extreme Weather & Climate Change: Overview, CLIMATE COMMC’N, 
https://www.climatecommunication.org/new/features/extreme-weather/overview/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Ker Than, Scientists: Natural Disasters Becoming More 
Common, LIVE SCIENCE (Oct. 17, 2005), https://www.livescience.com/414-scientists-natural-disasters-
common.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“According to the EM-DAT, the total 
natural disasters reported each year has been steadily increasing in recent decades, from 78 in 1970 to 348 in 
2004.”). 
3.  See Dan Drollette Jr., Just 90 Companies Are Accountable For More Than 60 Percent of Greenhouse 
Gases, THE BULLETIN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/just-90-companies-are-accountable-more-60-
percent-greenhouse-gases10080 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how just 90 
entities are responsible for 63% of all industrial carbon dioxide [CO2] and methane emissions); and see Oliver 
Milman, Oil Industry Knew of ‘Serious’ Climate Concerns More Than 45 Years Ago, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 
2016, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/13/climate-change-oil-industry-environment-
warning-1968 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that in 1968, the Stanford 
Research Institute had warned in a report about the serious consequences of climate change, which the president 
of the Center for International Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil 
industry worked to actively undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action 
even as its own knowledge of climate risks was growing.”).  
4. Damien Carrington, Fossil Fuels Subsidised by $10m a Minute, Says IMF, THE GUARDIAN (May 18, 
2015, 9:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/18/fossil-fuel-companies-getting-10m-a-
minute-in-subsidies-says-imf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that 
internationally, governments spend an estimated $10 million a minute on fossil fuels).  
5. See Richard Harris, Global Warming is Irreversible, Study Says, NPR (Jan. 26, 2009, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (citing NOAA: “[C]limate change is essentially irreversible.”); and see Earl J. Ritchie, Have We Passed 
the Climate Change Tipping Point?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2017, 6:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/ 
2017/03/16/have-we-passed-the-climate-change-tipping point/#73a9f1cb7e12 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (“A few years ago, 400 [ppm of CO2] was widely cited as the tipping point for climate 
change. Now that we have passed that value, it has become common to say that it wasn’t really a tipping point, 
that it was symbolic or a milestone. Whether it’s a tipping point or a milestone, we have decisively passed it and 
CO2 levels appear certain to continue higher.”); but see EarthTalk, Have We Passed the Point of No Return on 
Climate Change?, SCI. AM. (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/have-we-passed-the-
point-of-no-return-on-climate-change/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“While we may 
not yet have reached the ‘point of no return’—when no amount of cutbacks on greenhouse gas emissions will 
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Government’s response is to embark on a “Road to Repeal,”6 climate change 
litigation will prove to be the most effective way to respond to the coming age of 
extreme weather. 
Advances in climate modeling now allow scientists to calculate anthropogenic 
climate change’s effect on the severity and frequency of natural disasters. These 
models provide an ascertainable nexus between the destruction of a private 
citizen’s home by an extreme weather event, for instance, and rising temperatures.7 
Years of data and advances in event attribution analysis also allow for quantifiable 
apportionment of gigatons of carbon (GtC) as emitted by individual actors in the 
fossil fuel industry.8 The amount of GtC emitted by the fossil fuel industry 
constitutes enough of the total anthropogenic GtC in the atmosphere to justify 
singling out this sector in particular.9 When viewed in light of the industry’s 
intentional misconduct of suppressing climate science and preventing meaningful 
policy change,10 plaintiffs seeking to sue the industry have a meritorious cause of 
action under the common law tort theory of negligence. Further, private citizens 
and not state or local governments must litigate this issue, through the common 
law rather than statutes, to avoid jurisdictional barriers of environmental law, 
minimize political manipulation of the outcome, and ensure that private citizens 
themselves can be made whole.11 
This Comment is a drop in the bucket of numerous scholarly writings that 
 
save us from potentially catastrophic global warming—climate scientists warn we may be getting awfully 
close.”). 
6. ‘A Road to Repeal’ Document, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/ 
02/04/us/doc-lobby.html [hereinafter Road to Repeal Document] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
7. John Vidal, Storm Desmond Rainfall Partly Due to Climate Change, Scientists Conclude, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/11/storm-desmond-rainfall-
flooding-partly-due-to-climate-change-scientists-conclude (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (“Researchers ran climate modeling experiments and found that climate change made flooding 40% more 
likely.”).  
8. RICHARD HEEDE, CLIMATE MITIGATION SERVS., CARBON MAJORS: ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON AND 
METHANE EMISSIONS 1854–2010 METHODS & RESULTS REPORT (Apr. 7, 2014), available at 
http://climateaccountability.org/pdf/MRR%209.1%20Apr14R.pdf (on file with The University of Pacific Law 
Review). 
9. Dan Drollette Jr., Just 90 Companies Are Accountable for More Than 60 Percent of Greenhouse Gases, 
THE BULLETIN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/just-90-companies-are-accountable-more-60-percent-
greenhouse-gases10080 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how just 90 entities 
are responsible for 63% of all industrial CO2 and methane emissions).  
10.   See Oliver Milman, Oil Industry Knew of ‘Serious’ Climate Concerns More Than 45 Years Ago, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/13/climate-change-oil-
industry-environment-warning-1968 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the 
Stanford Research Institute presented a report about the serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which 
the president of the Center for International Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence 
that the oil industry worked to actively undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate 
action even as its own knowledge of climate risks was growing.”).  
11.   See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
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parse out the concept of climate change litigation.12 Yet recent developments, the 
magnitude of harm involved in climate change, and the risk that issue preclusion 
will prohibit novel and effective theories of recovery, all merit an updated 
discussion of the legal remedies available.13 Importantly, the legal analysis 
concerning the most fundamental issue for climate litigants—displacement and 
preemption by federal air quality laws—may be altered by the current 
Administration’s retreat from the area it supposedly occupies, i.e. the area of 
greenhouse gas regulation.14 
Part II provides a brief scientific overview of the basic principles of climate 
change15 and a short summary of how political bribery by the fossil fuel industry 
and other U.S. Government inaction has concealed and muddied the scientific 
evidence.16 Part III discusses the legal background of environmental litigation,17 
and then uses a comparative approach to assess the successes and failures of 
litigation with other, non-environmental industries like tobacco and 
pharmaceuticals.18 Part IV uses the principles delineated from the prior sections to 
develop a coherent litigation strategy that can avoid the barriers facing similarly 
situated plaintiffs.19 
II. BASIC SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 
This Part lays out the basic principles of climate change, beginning in Section 
A with an explanation of the vital role greenhouse gases play in regulating 
climate.20 Section B summarizes the political history of climate change—that is, 
the rejection of scientific projection through misinformation, concealment, and 
political bribery.21 
A. What Are Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)? 
The terms “global warming” or “climate change” refer to the accelerated rate 
at which the planet is heating up due to the accumulation of greenhouse gases 
 
12.   Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel 
Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 259 (2015); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to 
a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); David Hunter & James 
Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1757 
(2007). 
13.   Infra Part IV.  
14.   See infra Part IV.B.1. 
15.   Infra Part II.  
16.   Infra Part II.B. 
17.   Infra Part III. 
18.   Infra Part III.B. 
19.   Infra Part IV. 
20.   Infra Part II.A. 
21.   Infra Part II.B. 
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(GHGs) in the atmosphere.22 GHGs—including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), ozone (O3), and water vapor (H2O)—absorb sun rays reflecting off Earth’s 
surface and then reflect them back. This traps heat in the atmosphere like the walls 
of a greenhouse.23 Large amounts of greenhouse gases are present in the 
atmosphere naturally; animals (including humans) release CO2 when breathing,
24 
volcanic eruptions release anywhere up to 440 million tons of CO2 a year,
25 and 
water vapor is always present in the atmosphere through evaporation of Earth’s 
surface water.26 Having been regulated by photosynthetic and other natural 
processes up until the industrial era,27 anthropogenic (human-caused) events have 
rapidly increased concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere causing accelerated 
warming of the Earth’s surface and oceans.28 
Scientists predict that the rapid rate at which the temperature is rising will 
cause devastating global impacts; i.e., if we continue to pump carbon into the air, 
which has a linear relationship to temperature, we can expect the climate to deviate 
from its normal range as regulated by natural processes, and start acting in a more 
extreme, chaotic fashion.29  Giving credence to this notion, a National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report stated: 
The years 2017 and 2016 each had a historically high number of billion-
dollar disasters that impacted the U.S. (16 and 15 events, respectively). 
However, in 2017, the U.S. experienced a rare combination of high 
disaster frequency, disaster cost, and diversity of weather and climate 
extreme events.30 
 
22.   Amanda MacMillan, Global Warming 101, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/global-warming-101 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
23.   What Are Greenhouse Gases?, NAT’L CTRS FOR ENVTL. INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring 
-references/faq/greenhouse-gases.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
24.   Food Factories, LEGACY PROJECT, http://www.legacyproject.org/activities/foodfactories.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
25.   Volcanic Gases Can Be Harmful to Health, Vegetation and Infrastructure, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., 
https://volcanoes.usgs.gov/vhp/gas.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
26.   What Are Greenhouse Gases?, supra note 23.  
27.   Id.  
28.   INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 
(Rajendra K.R Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/ 
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Human influence on the 
climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history.”). 
29.   Carbon Emissions Linked to Global Warming in Simple Linear Relationship, SCI. DAILY, 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/090610154453.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
30.   Adam B. Smith, 2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: A Historic Year in Context, 
NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/news-
features/blogs/beyond-data/2017-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historic-year (on file with The 
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Among other factors such as an “increase in population and material wealth,” 
NOAA attributed this trend to climate change, which, it noted “[increases] 
vulnerability to drought, lengthen[s] wildfire seasons and the potential for 
extremely heavy rainfall and inland flooding events.”31 
B. American Climate Denial: A Brief History 
Drought, wildfire, and increased flooding are verifiable effects of climate 
change that will continue to occur given our current understanding of physics and 
chemistry.32 In addition, the ability to predict how rising temperatures will 
destabilize the climate and cause more extreme weather patterns has existed for 
decades without any serious disagreement.33 
Yet these well-established scientific findings have not been consistently 
accepted and reacted to accordingly.34 For example, scientists and politicians alike 
decried the Bush Administration’s handling of climate science in what the Union 
of Concerned Scientists characterized as “manipulation, suppression, and 
misrepresentation of science.”35 After President Barack Obama took office, the oil 
and gas sector’s lobbying expenditures broke records.36 A study of campaign 
spending found that the four largest 501(c)(4) groups (including the American 
Energy Alliance, David Koch’s Americans for Propensity, and Karl Rove’s 
Crossroads GPS) spent nearly $30 million on campaign ads, 85 percent of which 
contained at least one deceptive claim.37 
 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
31.   Id.  
32.   Thomas C. Peterson, William M. Connolley & John Fleck, The Myth of the 1970s Global Cooling 
Scientific Consensus, AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1328 (Sept. 2008), available at http://journals.ametsoc.org 
/doi/pdf/10.1175/2008BAMS2370.1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
33.   Id. (explaining how in 1975, newly developed climate modeling technology was able to lead to the 
“resounding” conclusion that global warming existed).   
34.   See, e.g., Investigating the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science, MIT W. HEMISPHERE PROJECT, 
http://web.mit.edu/hemisphere/events/bushscience.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
35.   Id.  The findings of the Union of Concerned Scientists were as follows:  
(1) High-ranking political appointees in the Bush Administration have repeatedly suppressed & 
distorted scientific findings, with adverse consequences for human health, public safety, & community 
well-being. (2) The federal government’s scientific advisory system has been manipulated to prevent 
the appearance of advice that might embarrass the Administration or stand in the way of its political 
agenda. (3) The Administration imposes restrictions on what government scientists can say or write 
about “sensitive” topics. And (4) The scope & scale of the manipulation, suppression, & 
misrepresentation of science by the Bush Administration appears to be unprecedented. 
Id.  
36.   Anne C. Mulkern, Oil and Gas Interests Set Spending Record for Lobbying in 2009, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/02/02greenwire-oil-and-gas-interests-set-spending-record-for-
l-1504.html?pagewanted=all (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting how Big Oil spent 
“at least $154 million on lobbying,” which was up 16 percent from the previous year).  
37.   High Percent of Presidential Ad Dollars of Top Four 501(c)(4)s Backed Ads Containing Deception, 
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Today, the Trump Administration’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Administrator, Scott Wheeler (a former coal lobbyist) does not consider climate 
change to be a top priority.38 This Administration has aggressively pursued 
deregulation of corporate polluters through executive action,39 withdrawal from 
the Paris Climate Accord, and appointment of EPA Administrators who do not 
recognize the urgent need for immediate reduction of CO2.
40 
Political manipulation has successfully perpetuated an anti-science aura within 
the United States; in fact, a Gallup poll revealed that only 42% of Republicans 
believe that the scientific community agrees about climate change—an 11 point 
drop from when Trump took office in 2017.41 Thus, there is a long history of 
opposition to climate change science by both the U.S. Government and the 
massively profitable Carbon Majors that have shaped policy directly and confused 
the public.42 
Because this dysfunctional government and confused public has precluded the 
necessary policy changes, extreme weather events such as the California wildfires, 
and Hurricanes Maria, Irma, and Harvey will only become progressively worse.43 
It is unclear when proportional action will be taken, particularly when legislators 
continue to gut numerous regulations aimed at reducing coal emissions, water 
pollution, and methane on the Road to Repeal.44 In the interim, private citizens 
should use the court system to protect themselves financially in the wake of more 
extreme weather.45 
 
Annenberg Study Finds, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (June 20, 2012), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycent 
er.org/high-percent-of-presidential-ad-dollars-of-top-four-501c4s-backed-ads-containing-deception-annenberg-
study-finds/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“From December 1, 2011 through June 1, 
2012, the four top presidential campaign spending 501(c)(4)s spent an estimated $24.9 million ($24,916,690) of 
their $29.3 million ($29,320,110) presidential ad dollars on ads containing deceptions.”). 
38.   Amy Gunia, EPA Chief Says Climate Change Is Not His Top Priority, TIME (Apr. 12, 2019), 
http://time.com/5569214/epa-chief-andrew-wheeler-climate-change/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (noting how Wheeler expressed doubt over studies indicating the urgent need for climate action). 
39.   Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6. 
40.   Eric Lipton, Energy Firms in Secretive Alliance with Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/us/politics/energy-firms-in-secretive-alliance-with-attorneys-general.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Brad Plumer, Scott Pruitt, E.P.A. Chief, Rented Residence 
From Wife of Energy Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/climate/scott-
pruitt-epa-rental.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
41.   Megan Brenan & Lydia Saad, Global Warming Concern Steady Despite Some Partisan Shifts, GALLOP 
(Mar. 28, 2018), http://news.gallup.com/poll/231530/global-warming-concern-steady-despite-partisan-
shifts.aspx?version=print (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
42.   Gunia, supra note 38; Robinson Meyer, Trump’s EPA Chief Denies the Basic Science of Climate 
Change, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trumps-epa-chief-
rejects-that-carbon-dioxide-emissions-cause-climate-change/519054/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (quoting Scott Pruitt: “[T]here’s “tremendous disagreement about the degree of [CO2’s] impact [on 
the climate]  . . .  I would not agree that it’s a primary contributor to the global warming that we see.”).  
43.   CLIMATE COMMC’N, supra note 2; Than, supra note 2 (“According to the EM-DAT, the total natural 
disasters reported each year has been steadily increasing in recent decades, from 78 in 1970 to 348 in 2004.”). 
44.   Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6. 
45.   See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing private citizens’ role in climate change litigation). 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Sufferers of environmental harm tend to have limited options in pursuing 
redress.46 Most environmental statutes like the Clean Water Act (CWA) and Clean 
Air Act (CAA) have citizen suit provisions written directly into the statute,47 
allowing private citizens to sue persons in violation of the Act,48 or the 
governmental agency charged with implementing it.49 Plaintiffs can also challenge 
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which generally 
gives any person who has “suffer[ed] legal wrong” or was “adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action” the ability to file suit directly with a district court.50 
Either way, plaintiffs seeking redress in any court—even when there are statutory 
mechanisms for such a suit—are constrained by the justiciability problem.51 
This Part begins by discussing the problems of justiciability in environmental 
litigation.52 Section B then looks outside environmental law, namely to the tobacco 
and pharmaceutical industries, to identify areas that plaintiffs damaged by extreme 
weather can borrow from in shaping an ideal litigation strategy.53  
A. Justiciability in Federal Courts 
The justiciability doctrine encompasses the various requirements that limit a 
court’s ability to hear a particular case.54 It carries prudential and pragmatic 
requirements designed to prevent judicial encroachment into matters reserved to 
other political branches.55 As a general matter, this requirement involves 
 
46.   Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 40 (2001). 
47.   Id. at 42. 
48.   See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) (granting the right to sue 
“any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of [this Act].”).  
49.   See, e.g., id. § 1365(a)(2) (granting the right to sue the “Administrator where there is alleged a failure 
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this [Act] which is not discretionary with the 
Administrator.”). 
50.   5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
51.   See infra Part III.A. 
52.   Infra Part III.A.  
53.   Infra Part III.B. 
54.   Justiciability,  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining justiciability as “the quality, state, 
or condition of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court”).  
55.   See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178 
(D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political 
question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is 
more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and 
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.   
Id.  
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consideration of the pertinent legal issues,56 involved parties,57 and timing of the 
case.58 These requirements will differ according to the desired jurisdiction; as such, 
a case that is justiciable in a state court may not be justiciable in federal courts.59 
Subsection 1 discusses the aspect of justiciability focused on “who” is bringing 
the lawsuit, known as the Standing Doctrine.60 Subsections 2, 3, and 4 then address 
those aspects focused on the underlying legal issues involved—the displacement 
of federal common law,61 preemption,62 and the political question doctrine,63 
respectively. 
1. Standing 
The U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts,64 permitting 
only those lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who have “standing to sue.” This standard  
will bar plaintiffs who cannot show: (1) an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent;” (2) “a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”65 This has prevented various environmental 
harm claims from proceeding on the merits, typically for failure to meet the 
causation element.66 States acting as plaintiffs, on the other hand, appear to have a 
 
56.   See Powell, 395 U.S. at 512–13 (“A federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter (1) 
if the cause does not ‘arise under’ the federal Constitution, laws, or treaties (or fall within one of the other 
enumerated categories of U.S. Const. Art. III); or (2) if it is not a ‘case or controversy’ within the meaning of that 
phrase in Art. III; or (3) if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.”). 
57.   See Wright, 468 U.S. at 739, 751 (describing the standing doctrine as encompassing “several judicially 
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising 
another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed 
in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked . . . [The core component is] the plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable 
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”). 
58.   See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (explaining that a case will become “moot” when 
“the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome”). 
59.   See Wright, 468 U.S. at 750 (suing in federal court requires Article III standing). 
60.   Infra Part III.A.1. 
61.   Infra Part III.A.2. 
62.   Infra Part III.A.3. 
63.   Infra Part III.A.4. 
64.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party . . . between 
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; 
between citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.  
Id. 
65.   Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
66.   See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2013). In finding the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to compel the state’s EPA to regulate the state’s oil refineries, the court noted:  
[I]t is not possible to quantify a causal link, in any generally accepted scientific way, between GHG 
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significant upper hand in establishing Article III standing as a result of their “quasi-
sovereign interests,”67 but as is argued herein, private citizens should still 
undertake this litigation on their own behalf. 
In essence, it is the global and nebulous nature of climate-related claims that 
has prevented plaintiffs from establishing the causation needed for standing.68 As 
will be discussed in Part IV,69 judicial hesitation to apportion liability is now belied 
by accurate methods to attribute GHG emissions to particular actors. Nonetheless, 
even recognizing event attribution analyses as a means of establishing causation 
can speak only to the “who” aspect of justiciability—whether the plaintiff has 
standing to sue in federal courts.70 
2. Displacement of Federal Common Law 
The “what” aspect (which claims a plaintiff can pursue) is similarly 
contentious by virtue of the statutory framework already in place,71 and the 
exceedingly political nature of environmental law in general.  
Codification of environmental law occurred relatively recently and virtually 
all at once; in an eco-conscious fervor, laws passed in the 1970’s included the 
Clean Air Act (CAA),72 the Clean Water Act (CWA),73 and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).74 Various wakeup calls helped shift the 
American zeitgeist to garner the requisite political capital: pollution was so severe 
that rivers caught fire,75 and city smog became so poisonous it killed dozens.76 
 
emissions from any single oil refinery in Washington, or the collective emissions of all five oil 
refineries located in Washington, and direct, indirect or cumulative effects on global climate change 
in Washington or anywhere else. 
Id.  
67.   See Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Congress has . . . recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its 
rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting 
its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
68.   Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144. 
69.   Infra Part IV. 
70.   See infra Part III.A.2. 
71.   See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) 
(representing one federal law that could potentially preclude climate change claims on preemption grounds). 
72.   42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671q (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
73.   33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1388 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
74.   42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321–4370m (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).  
75.   Jennifer Latson, The Burning River that Sparked a Revolution, TIME (June 22, 2015), 
http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (commemorating 
the anniversary of Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River bursting into flames on June 22, 1969, and noting how it sparked 
the passage of the Clean Water Act). 
76.   Ann Murray, Smog Deaths in 1948 Led to Clean Air Laws, NPR (Apr. 22, 2008, 9:43 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103359330 (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (detailing the events of October 27, 1948, where 20 people died and “half the town was sick” as a 
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However, this legislative framework—at least in the context of climate change 
litigation—operates as more of an obstacle than a crutch for plaintiffs.77 
Importantly, the CAA, as well as relevant state iterations of the same, have caused 
several cases to fail as a result of displacement.78 
Federal courts’ ability to create common law has been constrained by the 
fundamental understanding of Erie, namely that substantive law, unless in the form 
of federal statute or constitutional directive, should be fashioned by the states.79 
The Erie Doctrine suggests that federal common lawmaking is warranted only in 
rare situations, and must relate to matters within “national legislative power where 
Congress has so directed or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so 
demands.”80 To wit: “issues of national concern.”81 It is no longer true that there 
“is no federal common law;”82 there is, and it includes matters of “air and water in 
their ambient or interstate aspects.”83 Thus, for matters pertaining to climate 
change, federal common law can only be fashioned where Congress has “not 
spoken to a particular issue.”84 
The CAA established a comprehensive scheme for the national regulation of 
hazardous air pollutants,85 motor vehicle emissions,86 and the promulgation of 
ambient air quality standards.87 The Act requires the EPA administrator to set 
“standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from . . . new motor 
vehicles . . . which in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, 
air pollution . . . reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”88 
Further, although states generally cannot regulate new motor vehicle emissions89 
and their standards cannot be “less stringent” than those set out federally,90 the 
CAA gives states the “primary responsibility” for “assuring air quality within the 
 
result of industrial pollution).  
77.   Adler, supra note 46, at 84. 
78.   See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (finding the federal common law 
displaced plaintiff’s claims seeking abatement). 
79.   Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
80.   Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011) (citing Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408 n. 119, 421–22 (1964) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
81.   Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 
405 (1964). 
82.   Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
83.   Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972). 
84.   Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).  
85.   CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401, 7412 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
86.   Id. § 7521; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dept. of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).  
87.   Id. §§ 7408–7409. 
88.   Id. § 7521(a)(1). 
89.   Id. § 7543 (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard 
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”).  
90.   Id. § 7416. 
 
2019 / Litigation for the Era of Extreme Weather 
662 
entire geographic area comprising such state.”91 
Massachusetts v. EPA confirmed that GHGs fit within the Act’s “capacious 
definition of air pollutant,” and as a result, held that the CAA authorizes the EPA 
to regulate them.92 This led the Supreme Court to conclude that Congress had 
“directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse gas emissions … [and] 
therefore displaced federal common law” in American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. 
Connecticut (AEP).”93 
In AEP, eight states, New York City, and several land trusts sued in federal 
district court seeking to put an emissions cap on five of the state’s largest CO2 
emitters, to be reduced annually, under a federal common law public nuisance 
theory.94 The Supreme Court refused to do so, citing the CAA’s occupation of the 
field of GHG regulation, which it said displaced plaintiffs’ federal common law 
nuisance claims.95 
Interestingly, the EPA had not yet begun exercising its regulatory authority 
over GHGs at the time the AEP lawsuit was filed.96 As such, the plaintiffs argued 
that there could not be displacement, seeing as the EPA never actually regulated 
GHGs.97 The Court rejected this argument, explaining it was the mere fact of 
occupation, not the manner of occupation, that comprises the test for 
displacement.98 In other words, if Congress enacted a law pertaining to GHG 
regulation, it is inconsequential (for displacement purposes) if the agency charged 
with issuing those regulations refuses to do so.99 Since AEP, lawsuits revolving 
around GHGs have struggled to get past displacement.100 
 
91.   Id. § 7407(a). 
92.   549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
93.   Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding Massachusetts v. EPA 
determined that Congress “had spoken directly to the issue” of greenhouse gas emission by empowering the EPA 
to regulate them under the CAA).  
94.   Id. at 2534–37. 
95.   Id. at 2537 (“[T]he Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law 
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”). 
96.   Id. 
97.   Id. 
98.   See id. (responding to plaintiffs’ argument that the EPA had not displaced the field of regulation 
because it had not begun regulating GHGs: “Although EPA has not yet done precisely what plaintiffs demand 
here . . . that is not the relevant test . . . The question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has 
been occupied in a particular manner.”). 
99.   This, of course, is not to say that the agency would be immune from challenges alleging arbitrary and 
capricious agency inaction. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
115-140) (providing a general measure for invalidating agency action deemed arbitrary and capricious); and see 
42 U.S.C.A. § 7607 (Westlaw through Pub.L.No. 115–140) (providing for invalidation of arbitrary and capricious 
action in the specific context of the Clean Air Act). 
100.   See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding that the public nuisance 
action against five of the “largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States” was displaced by the Clean Air 
Act and the “EPA actions it authorizes”); see also Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 
453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (finding that a public nuisance claim for the damage caused to fishing grounds by dumping 
sewage in the ocean was displaced by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act). 
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3. Preemption 
The issue of preemption is relevant because of Milwaukee I, which held that 
interstate water pollution required “uniform federal standards” and was therefore 
a matter for federal law.101 The “implicit corollary” to this conclusion was that the 
varying state common law claims over the interstate water pollution were 
preempted.102 A few years later, the Supreme Court clarified that this did not apply 
to the common law of the pollution’s source state regarding intrastate water 
pollution. In other words, plaintiffs could only use state common law to sue water 
polluters within their own state, and federal common law would govern if the 
polluters were from other states.103 
Although Milwaukee’s I–III involved the CWA and interstate water 
pollution,104 courts have said that the preemption and displacement analyses would 
be identical for the CAA and interstate air pollution.105 Thus, as long as the suit 
does not involve air pollution that is interstate, the CAA does not preempt “the 
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any 
standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement 
respecting control or abatement of air pollution.”106 Put differently, the CAA does 
not preempt claims at common law under the source state for intrastate pollution.107 
4. Political Question 
A fourth challenge facing environmental plaintiffs is the highly political nature 
of environmental regulation.108 Yet even a political case will not pose a 
nonjusticiable political question if “the duty asserted can be judicially identified 
and its breach judicially determined, and . . . protection for [that right] . . . 
judicially molded.”109 Specifically, nonjusticiable political questions will arise if 
 
101.   Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972). 
102.   Id. at 105 n.6 (seeking to enjoin the City of Milwaukee from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan); 
see Tex. Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (“Federal common law and not the 
varying common law of the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for 
dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources 
outside of its domain.”). 
103.   Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–99 (1987). 
104.   Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972) (Milwaukee I); City of Milwaukee v. Ill. and 
Mich., 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II); Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (1984) (Milwaukee III).  
105.   See Merrick v. Diageo Ams. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (“What was true for the 
Clean Water Act holds true for the Clean Air Act.”). 
106.  Id. at 688. 
107.  Id. at 695 (“There is no basis in the Clean Air Act on which to hold that the source state common law 
claims of plaintiffs are preempted.”). 
108.   See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (saying that plaintiffs’ nuisance 
claims were presenting nonjusticiable political questions). 
109.   Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). 
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one of the following formulations is “inextricable”110 from the case: 
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial  policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of the government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.111 
In areas of environmental litigation, courts have said that the third factor—the 
“impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion”—is most relevant.112 For instance, when the Supreme 
Court evaluated the plaintiffs’ nuisance claims in AEP, it remarked that 
adjudication would require “an initial policy decision in deciding whether there 
has been an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general 
public.”113 This, it said, turned on a complicated balancing of interests that was 
reserved to a coordinate branch.114 However, as will be discussed below,115 use of 
common law negligence—for which the legal duty is relative to the reasonableness 
of the risk created to the plaintiff116—is less likely to require a policy determination 
about what level of GHGs in the atmosphere is reasonable. 
B. Industry Comparison 
Several commentators have speculated that the looming threat of a climate 
breakdown will lead to a rebirth of the creative litigation used throughout the 
waves of the tobacco litigation.117 Subsection 1 examines those waves to determine 
 
110.   Id. at 217. 
111.   Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
112.   See Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *17 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Although several of the Baker indicators support the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s current 
claims raise non-justiciable political questions, the third indicator is most relevant on the current record.”); see 
also Conn. v. Am. Elec. Co. , Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (focusing on the third Baker factor).  
113.  Id. at *23 (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations 
omitted)).  
114.   Id. at *24. 
115.   See infra Part IV.C.1. 
116.   See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345 (1928) (“Negligence, like risk, is thus a term 
of relation.”). 
117.   See, e.g., Kurtis Alexander, Suing Big Oil Over Climate Change, Santa Cruz Eyes Wildfire, Storm 
Costs, S.F. GATE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Suing-Big-Oil-over-climate-change-
Santa-Cruz-12445020.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The city and county of Santa 
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what lessons can translate to a hypothetical climate change plaintiff.118 Subsection 
2 then examines another era of litigation involving the infamous DES 
medication.119 
1. Tobacco 
Tobacco litigation in the United States took place in three conceptual waves; 
the first two span from approximately 1954 to 1995.120 Wave One (1954–1962)121 
commenced after various publications revealed a link between cigarette smoking 
and cancer. However, due to the aggressive defense put up by Big Tobacco, 
decades went by without meaningful discovery or adjudication on the merits.122 
During this time, about 95 percent of all lawsuits against Big Tobacco were 
dropped.123 Substantively, the lawsuits failed to show causation between cigarettes 
and lung cancer because a lack of consensus existed over the health effects of 
smoking.124 For example, in 1963, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a 
plaintiff widower’s claims of breach of implied warranty and negligence against 
defendant tobacco companies.125 Explaining why the plaintiff failed to establish a 
causal connection between the cigarettes and her late husband’s cancer, the court 
stated: “[T]he manufacturer had no opportunity to gain knowledge, or to form a 
judgment as to the dangerous qualities of the product. The manufacturer was in no 
 
Cruz have joined a growing number of communities suing oil companies over climate change, alleging a plot in 
which the fossil fuel industry concealed the dangers of its products from consumers, much like the tobacco 
industry did decades ago”); see also Sebastian Malo, Hurricane Harvey’s Aftermath Could See Pioneering 
Climate Lawsuits, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-harvey-
climatechange/hurricane-harveys-aftermath-could-see-pioneering-climate-lawsuits-idUSKCN1BG2NI (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (saying that the culmination of the tobacco litigation suits resulted 
from the “consensus built around the scientific finding that an increased likelihood of lung cancer could be 
attributed to smoking.”). 
118.   Infra Part IV.B.1. 
119.   Infra Part IV.B.2. 
120.   Stephen E. Smith, “Counterblastes” to Tobacco: Five Decades of North American Tobacco 
Litigation, 14 WINDSOR REV. LEG. & SOC. ISSUES 1, 6 (2002). 
121.   Id.  
122.   Id. 
123.   W.E. Townsley & D.K. Hanks, The Trial Court’s Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation 
Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL W. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989) 
[Tobacco companies] have [forced plaintiffs to drop lawsuits] by taking exceedingly lengthy oral 
depositions of plaintiffs and by gathering, through written deposition, every scrap of paper ever 
generated about a plaintiff, from cradle to grave. And they have done it by taking endless depositions 
of plaintiffs, expert witnesses, and by naming multiple experts of their own for each specialty, such as 
pathology, thereby putting plaintiffs’ counsel in the dilemma of taking numerous expensive 
depositions or else not knowing what the witness intends to testify to at trial. And they have done it 
by taking dozens and dozens of oral depositions, all across the country, of trivial fact witnesses, 
particularly in the final days before trial. 
Id. 
124.   Smith, supra note 120, at 8. 
125.   Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1963). 
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better position than the consumer.”126 This argument later became ineffective as 
consensus developed around the objective dangers of smoking.127 
Wave Two was ultimately as unsuccessful as Wave One, despite there being a 
greater willingness by plaintiffs’ lawyers to spend substantial resources in 
litigation during this time.128 Based on Big Tobacco’s argument that smokers 
assumed the risk of smoking with full knowledge of its danger, courts found that 
the Cigarette Acts, a federal law establishing labeling requirements and warnings 
for tobacco products, preempted any claims against manufacturers.129 
By and large, the theories of recovery used in these two waves were rooted in 
negligence and were easily rebuffed by Big Tobacco’s hard push to keep the focus 
on personal responsibility.130 However, as plaintiffs invested in building their 
respective cases and discovery of industry documents substantiated the claims of 
industry misconduct, the assumption of the risk defense became less sustainable.131 
Consequently, plaintiffs began winning during Wave Three, earning damages 
ranging from $165,000 to $145 billion.132 This wave included actions brought by 
governmental bodies for reimbursement of health care expenditures,133 individual 
and class actions brought for personal injury caused by smoking, and claims 
alleging deceptive and unfair business practices by Big Tobacco over their 
concerted efforts to suppress information.134 
Stronger organization of the plaintiffs, conclusive evidence of causation, and 
knowledge of intentional industry misconduct brought long overdue success in 
suing the tobacco companies.135 Some argue the success was a result of the unified 
approach of 46 states all suing Big Tobacco for reimbursement of medical costs, 
which resulted in a hefty, yet controversial, settlement.136 
 
126.   Id. at 39. 
127.   See Brendan Nyhan, The Limits of the ‘Tobacco Strategy’ on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/upshot/the-limits-of-the-tobacco-strategy-on-climate-change.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how the release of “millions of internal 
tobacco company documents” helped to undermine the Tobacco industry’s defenses).  
128.   Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1331–1340 (2000)); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. 
No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1131–1140 (2000)). 
129.   Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
130.   Smith, supra note 120, at 16. 
131.   Nyhan, supra note 127. 
132.   Smith, supra note 120, at 20. 
133.   Id. at 18. 
134.   Id. at 16. 
135.   Id. at 21 (“By having access to documents that provide evidence of longstanding fraud and deliberate 
misrepresentation, not only is a plaintiff more likely to succeed, but the awarding of punitive damages becomes 
a real probability.”). 
136.   William T. Godshall, Giving 10% to Gain Eternity, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 437–39 (1999) (criticizing 
the reached Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) as being too lenient on the Tobacco companies).  
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2. Big Pharma’s DES 
Diethylstilbestrol, or “DES,” was a drug given to six million women during 
the 1940s and 1970s to prevent miscarriages.137 In litigating the lawsuits following 
an increase in miscarriages caused by the drug, theories of intra-industry joint 
liability began to emerge, lowering the causation hurdle for DES plaintiffs who 
experienced adverse side effects.138 
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, for instance, the California Supreme Court 
adopted a market share theory of liability for manufacturers of DES,139 even though 
clear causation could not be shown for each defendant.140 Shaping this remedy, the 
court relied on fundamental principles of fairness, explaining that: 
[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter 
should bear the cost of the injury. Here . . . plaintiff is not at fault in failing 
to provide evidence of causation, and although the absence of such 
evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, their conduct in 
marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years played a 
significant role in creating the unavailability of proof.141 
While this philosophy can easily be transposed to climate litigation, the very 
fact that market share liability served as the theory of apportionment was 
monumental142 because it shifted the burden of proof from innocent plaintiffs to 
the defendant pharmaceutical companies.143 
IV. LITIGATION STRATEGY 
Based on the information currently available in terms of event attribution, the 
apportionment of carbon by individual fossil fuel companies, and the decades-long 
conspiracy to prevent meaningful policy change in the United States, successful 
litigation on climate change is almost inevitable.144 The issue, then, becomes 
 
137.   Barbara J. Koperski, Market Share Liability for DES (Diethylstilbestrol) Injury: A New High Water 
Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. REV. 432 (1981). 
138.   Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980). 
139.   Id. at 611–12. 
140.   Id. (holding that it was reasonable in this particular context “to measure the likelihood that any of the 
defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each 
of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that 
purpose”). 
141.   Id. at 610–11. 
142.   N. Denise Taylor, California Expands Tort Liability Under the Novel Market Share Theory: Sindell 
v. Abbott Laboratories, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 4 (1981), available at https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol8/ 
iss4/4 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
143.   Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610–11. 
144.   See, e.g., Milman, supra note 3 (explaining how the Stanford Research Institute presented a report 
about the serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which the president for the Center for International 
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“who” is in the best position to sue, and “what” theories of recovery will likely 
result in meritorious victories.145 Section A addresses the “who” and sets forth the 
ideal hypothetical parties,146 and Section B discusses the “what”; the body of law 
and remedies most likely to result in making the plaintiffs whole.147 
A. Hypothetical Parties 
Party selection cannot be taken lightly, as there are not only jurisdictional 
limitations regarding who may sue, but the political motivations behind whomever 
brings these climate change lawsuits can severely limit the awards rendered.148 
Thus, Subsection 1 argues that the ideal, hypothetical plaintiff is the private 
citizen149 because climate change litigation that is democratized stands a better 
chance of success than it would with governmental plaintiffs. Subsection 2 
discusses why the Carbon Majors are the proper defendants given their central role 
in destabilizing the climate and their ability to pay large damage awards.150 
1. Private Citizens as Plaintiffs 
Certain commentators advocate for governmental bodies bringing lawsuits to 
address climate-related injury.151 That prospect is appealing insofar as states may 
have a heightened ability to possess Article III standing as opposed to private 
citizens,152 and because state litigants generally have greater resources and are 
more organized. Nevertheless, climate lawsuits can proceed in state, rather than 
federal, courts where Article III standing will not come into play.153 Furthermore, 
private citizens are more likely to obtain adequate damages and deter future 
misconduct through the democratization of climate change litigation.154 
Put simply, governmental bodies cannot be trusted to be independent of fossil 
fuel influence given the ever-increasing role that legalized bribery has on the 
composition and decision-making of the political branches and the long history of 
 
Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil industry worked to actively 
undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action even as its own knowledge of 
climate risks was growing.”); MIT W. HEMISPHERE PROJECT, supra note 34. 
145.   See infra Part IV.A-B. 
146.   See infra Part IV.A. 
147.   Infra Part IV.B. 
148.   See infra Part IV.A.1. 
149.   Infra Part IV.A. 
150.   Infra Part IV.B. 
151.   Wood & Galpern, supra note 12. 
152.   See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (finding states are “not normal litigants” for purposes of 
Article III standing and suggested that they were entitled to “special solicitude”).  
153.   See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
154.   See Part IV.C. 
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politicizing climate science.155 In 2014 alone, the fossil fuel industry spent 
$387,945.00 per day lobbying the government.156 Largely due to a series of recent 
decisions that weakened campaign finance laws,157 these contributions are part of 
a systematic effort by the fossil fuel industry, via proxy Republicans and 
Democrats alike, to limit its regulatory burden.158 Thus, far from being a partisan 
issue, the underlying defect in the U.S. political process has been the invidious 
incentive structure whereby industries can give unlimited amounts of money to 
politicians who can then turn around and write laws and regulations that benefit 
those same industries.159 
The fossil fuel and tobacco industries are extraordinarily similar: both were 
well-versed in the harms their products posed yet pushed them on the public 
anyhow, and both used political engineering and disinformation campaigns to 
extract as much wealth as they could before the public became aware of the actual 
externalities.160 This is not to disparage the attempts of the several cities, including 
New York City, San Francisco, and Oakland, that already have initiated climate 
lawsuits.161 But it is important to note that when state and local governments have 
banded together to hold a major industry accountable in the past, namely when 47 
 
155.   See Milman, supra note 3 (explaining how the Stanford Research Institute presented a report about 
the serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which the president for the Center for International 
Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil industry worked to actively 
undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action even as its own knowledge of 
climate risks was growing.”). 
156.   See JOHN NOËL, CLEAN WATER ACTION/CLEAN WATER FUND, THE CHILLING EFFECT OF OIL & GAS 
MONEY ON DEMOCRACY (2016), available at https://www.cleanwateraction.org/sites/default/files/docs/publicat 
ions/Money_in_Politics_05%2003%2016a_web%20-%20FINAL.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (“According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the oil and gas sector spent $141,600,720 on 
lobbying in 2014, or $387,945.00 a day. It employed over 800 lobbyists, enough to easily cover each member of 
Congress.”). 
157.   See Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (finding the First Amendment 
prohibited capping corporate spending on political advertising).  
158.   See NOËL, supra note 156 (explaining that House members taking more than $100,000 by fossil fuels 
were nearly twice as likely as members taking less than that to vote against clean air laws, while Senators who 
took more than $500,000 were three times more likely.”).  
159.   See Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 
20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-
democracy/390822/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how the beginning of 
business lobbying saw immediate success: “[the business lobbying efforts] killed a major labor law reform, rolled 
back regulation, lowered their taxes, and helped to move public opinion in favor of less government intervention 
in the economy.”); see also NOËL, supra note 156.  
160.   See Dana Nuccitelli, Is the Fossil Fuel Industry, Like the Tobacco Industry, Guilty of Racketeering?  
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-
per-cent/2015/sep/29/is-the-fossil-fuel-industry-like-the-tobacco-industry-guilty-of-racketeering  (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting U.S.US District Court Judge Gladys Kessler: “[T]he tobacco 
industry’s campaign to ‘maximize industry profits by preserving and expanding the market for cigarettes through 
a scheme to deceive the public’ about the health hazards of smoking amounted to a racketeering enterprise.”).  
161.   Natasha Geiling, Two Major Cities Demand Fossil Fuel Companies Pay for Climate Damages, THINK 
PROGRESS (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/bay-area-sues-oil-companies-c34222138f6a/ (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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states and Big Tobacco entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 
1998, the end result was lackluster at best.162 For one, state officials contracted 
with just a few law firms promising them fifteen to twenty percent of any 
recovery.163 While making several lawyers multi-millionaires, this tactic diverted 
away a huge chunk of the payout.164 After the attorneys were paid, it was the states’ 
political, economic, and other budgetary priorities that dictated where the 
settlement money went.165 In other words, relying on state and local governments 
to undertake climate change litigation risks inadequate outcomes subject to 
bureaucratic and budgetary misuse, similar to the Big Tobacco MSA.166 
As a corollary to the notion that governmental actors cannot be trusted to 
litigate these claims effectively, judges may in fact be more sympathetic to private 
citizens bringing these lawsuits as opposed to governmental actors.167 While the 
instinct is to blame the industry itself entirely, its donative influence can only 
accomplish deregulation to the extent its proxies in government autonomously 
decide to do it for them.168 It is important to note that failure to take the steps 
necessary to prevent the climate’s destabilization from becoming irreversible is not 
an aberration brought on by the Trump Administration; politicians and bureaucrats 
have enabled and subsidized violence to the environment for decades.169 Thus, it 
is ostensibly true that the goals of the federal and state governments are disjointed 
from those of its constituents, and this means that the private citizens who choose 
to stand up for their rights ineffectively protected by their government may have a 
greater chance in the eyes of a judge.170 Further, judges may feel larger damage 
awards are justified when the money goes directly to private citizens, and not a 
state’s general bank account to allocate as their policy, budgetary, and other 
bureaucratic caprices dictate.171 
Therefore, if the goal of climate litigation is to make private citizens whole—
with either a dual or incidental purpose of deterrence—the plaintiffs’ underlying 
 
162.   Godshall, supra note 136. 
163.   Barry Meier, The Spoils of Tobacco Wars; Big Settlement Puts Many Lawyers in the Path of a 
Windfall, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/22/business/spoils-tobacco-wars-big-
settlement-puts-many-lawyers-path-windfall.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating 
one law firm was guaranteed $1 billion in legal fees from the settlements). 
164.   Id. 
165.   Id. 
166.   Godshall, supra note 136. 
167.   Alexander, supra note 117.  
168.   See NOËL, supra note 156 (reporting on Big Oil’s lobbying efforts).  
169.   See Milman, supra note 3 (explaining the Stanford Research Institute presented a report about the 
serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which the president for the Center for International 
Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil industry worked to actively 
undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action even as its own knowledge of 
climate risks was growing.”). 
170.   Alexander, supra note 117. 
171.   Meier, supra note 163.  
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goals in pursuing the claims and the allocation of damages will be crucial.172 
2. Carbon Majors as Defendants 
Arguably, there are two distinct categories of defendants deserving of liability 
for exacerbating climate change: governmental bodies, including federal, state, and 
local governments, and corporations.173 The undeniable appeal of suing state and 
local governments lies with the tangible remedies that could result; i.e. the ability 
to compel and/or encourage adaptive city planning.174 Yet those adaptive measures 
will in many cases be reactionary: to be sure, 69% of Republicans and four percent 
of Democrats believe that the dangers of climate change are overreactions,175 
casting doubt over the ability or willingness of governments to make drastic, 
proactive changes. In any case, suing local governments—which are much less 
suited to satisfy large monetary judgements than the Carbon Majors—cannot 
address the particular interest that is the focus of this Comment: protectable, legal 
interests of private citizens.176 
Yet the sound critique of this designation bears mentioning: “why are 
automakers and power plants sued rather than their customers?”177 Surely, there is 
not “problematic arbitrariness”178 in selecting industry actors as defendants, just as 
it was not arbitrary to sue the tobacco companies and the manufacturers of DHS 
despite the fact that the victims were in some sense willing participants.  Reliable 
data can attribute the “lion’s share” of anthropogenic GHG emissions to an 
ascertainable number of Carbon Majors,179 and well-established notions of 
 
172.   Supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the indications that governmental actors may not achieve optimal 
success in climate change litigation).  
173.   See Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change Legal Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal 
Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 246266 (2014–2015) (arguing for local suits).  
174.   See id. at 266 (explaining that local governments are proper defendants for climate-based suits 
because they “are responsible for everything from land-use planning and development to infrastructure 
management to public health and emergency planning . . . [and are] the appropriate scale of government to address 
the issue because experiences of climate-induced weather events will vary at much smaller geographical scales” 
(internal citations omitted)).   
175.   Brenan & Saad, supra note 41. 
176.   See supra Part I (noting the desire to find solutions to make private citizens whole). 
177.   Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 18–19 (2011). 
If most courts are unwilling to view handgun manufacturers as proximate contributors to the public 
nuisance of violent crime, how many will see the oil industry and other corporate defendants as chiefly 
responsible for activities that, in truth, are imbricated throughout modern society and that only cause 
harmful impacts when combined with all other such activities and when traced forward through an 
extraordinarily complex series of ripple effects that span the planet? 
Id.  
178.   Id. at 18 (“[T]here is a problematic arbitrariness in plaintiffs’ designation of the defendant class.”). 
179.   See Suzanne Goldenberg, Just 90 Companies Caused Two-Thirds of Man-Made Global Warming 
Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013 11:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20/ 
90-companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (quoting climate researcher Richard Heede: “There are thousands of oil, gas and coal producers in 
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substantial causality can justify even joint and several liability for the indivisible 
harm experienced by climate change plaintiffs.180 Furthermore, as discussed more 
in Section C,181 the enormous disparity between the respective carbon footprints 
of oil companies and consumers render this argument unavailing. 
B. Body of Law, Venue, and Remedy 
It appears that for private plaintiffs, relying on statutory law to obtain damages 
leads to a dead end.182 Not only are there the jurisdictional barriers such as 
standing, but the political question doctrine and the displacement of federal 
common law have also come into play, causing many to lose hope for the 
possibility of climate change litigation.183 Subsection 1 posits that plaintiffs 
seeking damages for harm caused by exacerbated natural disasters should utilize 
state common law as their theory of recovery and avoid statutory violations 
altogether.184 Next, Subsection 2 discusses how plaintiffs can avoid the political 
question problem by choosing remedies that are compensatory in nature and 
choosing defendants that have engaged in intentional misconduct.185 
1. Common Law and Displacement 
Theoretically, one could bypass obscure justiciability problems by sticking 
with a well-established principle of state common law.186 But succeeding on such 
a claim—or at least getting to the merits of the case—would require that a judge 
find the state common law claims neither displaced by the federal common law, 
nor preempted by the federal statutes relating to the same subject.187 When it comes 
to climate change torts, however, state common law should not be displaced unless 
there is de facto occupation; unless there is actual agency action that can rationally 
 
the world . . . But the decision makers, the CEOs, or the ministers of coal and oil if you narrow it down to just 
one person, they could all fit on a Greyhound bus or two.”); see also HEEDE, supra note 8 (attributing GHG output 
to individual fossil fuel companies).  
180.   See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the imposition of joint and several liability).  
181.   See infra Part IV.C (arguing that individuals are not contributorily negligent in a res ipsa loquitur-
style analysis).  
182.   See supra Part III.A (discussing the problems of preemption and displacement).  
183.   See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011); Shweitzer, supra note 173 at 264 (arguing AEP 
“basically closed the door on climate change torts”). 
184.   Grossman, supra note 12, at 59 (“Tort-based climate change litigation strikes many people as a radical 
idea at first. Basic tort principles . . . combined with the overwhelming scientific consensus that global warming 
is occurring and the evidence that it is having present detrimental effects, may provide a basis for claims of some 
liability against fossil fuel companies . . . for some of climate change’s effects.”). 
185.   Infra Part IV.B.II. 
186.   McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). 
187.   Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 429 (2011). 
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be expected to mitigate the threat of climate change.188 
Massachusetts v. EPA said that GHGs were regulated under the CAA,189 and 
the Supreme Court has confirmed that the EPA is therefore the proper entity to 
combat the threat of climate change.190 All else being equal, this can be yielded to 
shut down all such claims having to do with GHGs and air quality.191 And, in AEP, 
the Court stated it was the fact, not the manner, of occupation of a particular field 
that comprised the test for displacement.192 What, then, comes of the fact that all 
mention of GHGs has been scrubbed from the EPA’s website, and that the current 
Administration has already engaged in historic deregulation of environmental 
regulation?193 
To wrap one’s head around that notion, here is a thought experiment: If 
Congress repealed the Clean Air Act, then it would be undeniable that causes of 
action relating to GHGs would no longer be displaced or preempted by federal 
law.194 But would a similar result obtain from largely executive inaction,195 absent 
specific statutory repeal that has gone through the legislative process? The answer 
is probably not, based on the fact that in AEP, the Court squarely rejected the 
argument that since the EPA had not started regulating GHGs it should not displace 
GHG-related causes of action.196 This would seem to confirm that even if the 
executive branch utterly failed to execute a law passed by Congress, that law can 
still be used to justify displacing state actions on the same subject.197 
The logic behind this test for displacement is clear in light of the channels 
already in place allowing for lawsuits against agencies if, for instance, one had the 
statutory directive to regulate GHGs yet refused to do so arbitrarily and 
capriciously.198  Here is another thought experiment: If the United States elected a 
 
188.   See infra Part IV.B.1. 
189.   Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
190.   Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 428. 
191.   See Shweitzer, supra note 173 at 264 (saying that AEP “basically closed the door on climate change 
torts”).  
192.   Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011). 
193.   Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6; Madison Park, EPA Removes Climate Change References 
from Website, Report Says, CNN (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/08/politics/epa-climate-change-
references/index.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
194.   See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. 426 (noting that the test for displacement is congressional 
occupation of the field).  
195.   See, e.g., Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6 (explaining executive plans to dismantle current 
regulations). 
196.   Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426. 
197.   Id.  
198.   Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) § 7607; see 
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 564 U.S. at 426 (“[W]ere EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions 
altogether at the conclusion of its ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to employ 
the federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency’s expert determination. EPA’s judgment, we hasten to 
add, would not escape judicial review.”).  
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president who thinks climate change is a Chinese hoax199 and whose administration 
has indicated that it would be willing to disobey federal court orders,200 such a 
scenario may render efforts to use district courts to compel unlawfully withheld 
agency action ineffective. That a new chief executive could replace the current one 
rather quickly201 does not take away from the potential that rogue administrations 
opposed to climate action will continue to occupy the White House. To be sure, 
the current U.S. landscape is itself in relatively depressed conditions: 60% of the 
entire country is unable to afford a $1,000 emergency,202 and movement up the 
economic ladder is unattainable for many given the high cost of education.203 
Therefore, it is prudent to treat a rogue administration as the product of the systems 
and policies already in place, rather than an isolated incident attributable to more 
comforting excuses, like Russian interference or Jill Stein.204 Furthermore, even a 
rogue administration that is in fact an anomaly and does lead to a rebirth of 
progressive liberalism in the U.S. (or, to be fair, at the least moderate-to-
conservative neo-liberalism)205 can still leave a long-lasting and even permanent 
 
199.   See Peter Baker, Does Donald Trump Still Think Climate Change Is a Hoax? No One Can Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rAPzsh (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the 
White House has refused to answer whether President Trump still retains such views, although he has tweeted, 
“The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-
competitive” and that “global warming is a total, and very expensive, hoax!”).  
200.   Dahlia Lithwick, Leon Neyfakh & Mark Joseph Stern, What Happens If Donald Trump Refuses a 
Federal Court Order, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2017, 9:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/news-and-politics/ 2017/01/what-
happens-if-donald-trump-refuses-a-federal-court-order.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (reporting that Customs and Border Protection were disregarding federal court orders, and enforcing 
Trump’s travel ban leading to the question with “little or no precedent in American history: What happens when 
the federal government or its agents refuse to honor a court order handed down by a federal judge?”).  
201.   See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The [president] . . . shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”). 
202.   See Eleanor Goldberg, Most Americans Can’t Afford a Minor Emergency, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 
29, 2018, 5:46 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/most-americans-cant-afford-to-pay-for-even-a-
minor-emergency_us_5a68e67ae4b0022830090e5b (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(noting how only “39 percent of Americans have enough money in savings to cover an unexpected $1,000 bill”).  
203.   See Robert Haveman & Timothy Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobility, 16 
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 125–50 (Fall 2006) (“The high concentration in the nation’s colleges and universities of 
youth from the top echelons of parental income and social class is disturbing and appears to be increasing.”).  
204.   See, e.g., Simon van Zuylen-Wood, Does This Man Know More Than Robert Mueller? Glenn 
Greenwald’s War on the Russia Investigation, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 21, 2018, 9:06 AM),) 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/glenn-greenwald-russia-investigation.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[T]he Russia-Trump story is a shiny red herring—one that distracts from 
the failures, corruption, and malice of the very Establishment so invested in promoting it.”); Jessie Van Amburg, 
Rachel Maddow Calls Out Third-Party Voters, TIME (Nov. 9, 2016), http://time.com/4564294/rachel-maddow-
third-party-candidates-election-2016/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Rachel 
Maddow of MNSBC on the 2016 election: “If you vote for somebody who can’t win for president, it means that 
you don’t care who wins for president.”); Eli Watkins, How Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Helped Elect Donald 
Trump, CNN (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/10/politics/gary-johnson-jill-stein-
spoiler/index.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
205.   The Obama Administration did begin taking steps toward regulating GHGs in “a set of much-
anticipated—and first ever—steps to regulate oil and gas industry emissions of methane, a powerful greenhouse 
gas second only to carbon dioxide in its role in the climate debate.” See Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, Obama 
Administration Announces Historic New Regulations for Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas, WASH. POST 
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mark—especially when it comes to the environment. In a single term, the Trump 
Administration has achieved historic deregulation of corporate polluters, 
appointed two justices to the Supreme Court, and broke a record on most appellate 
judges confirmed of any president in their first year in office.206 
Thus, when it comes to the impending existential crisis of global climate 
change, the distinction between fact and manner of occupation is illusory, and 
courts should require only de facto occupation by the coordinate political branch 
before finding that Congress has spoken.207 In other words, issues involving “the 
biggest threat to humanity”208 cannot be precluded from resolution by judges that 
are “particularly loath” to break from traditional norms.209 
States, of course, are not all on board with deregulation. Former California 
Governor Jerry Brown, for example, planned to heighten motor vehicle emissions 
standards, and other states have similarly worked to decrease their respective CO2 
emissions and maintain compliance with the Paris Climate Accord’s voluntary 
standards.210 Thus, any possible argument based on the EPA’s retreat from 
regulatory occupation of GHGs would fail in states where there continues to be 
strong regulation on the topic.211 
The interstate and intrastate air pollution distinction—as per Milwaukee’s 
analysis pertaining to water pollution—should also be recognized as illusory in the 
climate change context, and plaintiffs suing for interstate air pollution should not 
be limited to federal common law (subject to displacement) in the first place.212  
The concern in Milwaukee I was that even though states enacting more 
stringent standards than those of the federal CWA would generally further the 
purpose of environmental legislation, the risks inherent with inconsistent standards 
across state lines and the burden to industry compelled a finding that federal law 
 
(May 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/05/12/obama-administrati 
on-announces-historic-new-regulations-for-methane-emissions-from-oil-and-gas/?utm_term=.65c26c1d792a 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
206.   Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many Federal Appeals Judges as Obama 
in His First Year, TIME (Dec. 15, 2017), http://time.com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-record/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing a report by Axois: “Trump has successfully appointed 12 
so far; President Barack Obama confirmed just three in his first year, and President George W. Bush confirmed 
six. He beat out presidents Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, who each confirmed 11.”). 
207.   Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011).  
208.   Brian Kahn, Climate Change Is the World’s Biggest Risk, in 3 Charts, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Jan. 12, 
2017), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/climate-change-worlds-biggest-risk-charts-21050 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
209.   See John T. Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 
8 (1953) (“The common law has been able to maintain its preeminent place over the centuries because of its 
stability and its inherent capacity for keeping pace with the demands of an ever-changing and ever-growing 
civilization.”).  
210.   Evan Halper, A California-Led Alliance of Cities and States Vows to Keep the Paris Climate Accord 
Intact, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-paris-states-20170602-
story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
211.   Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 564 U.S. at 426. 
212.   Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
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was to control.213  This touches on the “interstate character” of the nature of the 
harm that the Carbon Majors have had on our hypothetical plaintiffs; that is, these 
fossil fuel companies are multi-national with operations all over the world, and 
their contribution to plaintiffs’ current harm is the culmination of decades of 
carbon emissions spread out across the planet.214 Yet, the fact that there is no 
express congressional displacement of state law (language in the CAA even 
provides specifically for maintenance of common law suits),215 means that the 
justification for preventing adjudication at the state level lies squarely with the 
concern that inconsistent standards will burden the industry. Not only does this 
justification make it harder to hold oil companies liable for their wrongdoing,216 it 
also disregards the fact that severe weather will damage different geographic areas, 
at different times, and to different extents, making the state-by-state adjudicatory 
process preferable for experimenting with theories of recovery. 
2. Compensatory Damages 
In addition to the use of common law, seeking remedies that are compensatory 
in nature and necessary to make plaintiffs whole can mitigate issues of 
nonjusticiable political questions.217 It may even be feasible to assume the CAA 
does not preempt claims of a non-regulatory nature brought by plaintiffs under the 
common law of at least the pollution’s source state.218 
While it is true that a government agency’s determination of how best to 
implement a statute is indeed political,219 a private cause of action against Carbon 
 
213.   Id. at n.6. 
214.   See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 422 (“[C]onsiderations of scale and complexity distinguish 
global warming from the more bounded pollution giving rise to past federal nuisance suits.”); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 57–58, Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (No. 10-174), available at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/10-174.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts, who argues that because “everyone is 
harmed by global warming,” letting the case continue would mean that “every individual in the world” could sue). 
215.   See CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) (“Except as otherwise 
provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof 
to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement 
respecting control or abatement of air pollution.”). 
216.   See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (holding that plaintiffs could not pursue their claims against 
the defendants). 
217.   See Gordon v. Tex., 153 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Monetary damages . . . do not . . . constitute 
a form of relief that is not judicially manageable.”). 
218.   Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 80 (Iowa 2014). 
219.   See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).) The Political Question Doctrine is  
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve 
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
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Majors is not. A private cause of action would not be based on whether a federal 
agency should or should not have put a certain statute in place.220 Suing Carbon 
Majors is based on the affirmative misconduct by billionaire, multi-national 
corporations that has caused and will continue to cause billions and eventually 
trillions of dollars in property damage alone.221 The harm that must be redressed 
does not arise from any difference in political opinion or expertise-based 
discretion, and the common law already provides adequate theories that a plaintiff 
can pursue.222 Furthermore, the damages sought by these claims will not be 
abatement;223 in other words, the redress awarded to successful plaintiffs will not 
be a mandate for Big Oil to reduce its contribution to global warming. Instead, 
redress would take the form of compensatory damages for the invasion of an 
individual right (e.g. the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness,224 and the 
right to use and enjoy one’s property). Therefore, staying closely connected to the 
common law of tort, which courts have said “provides clear and well-settled rules 
on which the district court can easily rely,”225 will obviate any unwarranted judicial 
lawmaking. 
As for the issue of preemption, several of the failed climate change cases 
asserted causes of action for failing to regulate; suggesting—or at least leaving 
open the possibility of—justiciability where the relief sought is tethered to non-
statutory interests.226 Courts have also recently held that the “purpose and function 
of the [CAA] differs sufficiently from the purpose and function of ‘a private 
lawsuit seeking damages anchored in ownership of real property’. . . [t]he purpose 
of state nuisance and common law actions is to protect the use and enjoyment of 
specific property, not to achieve a general regulatory purpose.”227 As stated in 
 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id.  
220.   Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 537533 (2007). 
221.   The Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-
energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/hidden-cost-of-fossils#.WlKd_1Q-eAw (last updated Aug. 30, 2016) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
222.   See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”).  
223.   See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857853 (9th Cir. 2012) (seeking 
abatement of CO2 emissions by coal plants); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011) (“The 
Court need not address the question whether, absent the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes, the 
plaintiffs could state a federal common-law claim for curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions because of their 
contribution to global warming. Any such claim would be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to 
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”). 
224.   U.S. CONST. amend. V; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
225.   McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007); Alperin v. Vatican 
Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 554 (9th Cir. 2005). 
226.   See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (suing for failure to regulate GHGs); Native Vill. of Kivalina 
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012) (attempting to sue the major polluting corporations that 
caused environmental harm to the city). 
227.   Brown–Forman Corp. v. Miller, 528 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Freeman v. Grain 
 
2019 / Litigation for the Era of Extreme Weather 
678 
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., “States may be preempted from setting their own 
emissions standards, but they are not preempted from compensating injured 
citizens.”228 And in Brown-Forman Corp. v. Miller: 
The [CAA] does not provide a mechanism for awarding monetary 
compensation to an injured party suffering from a particularized harm. 
“Thus, a property owner seeking full compensation for harm related to the 
use and enjoyment of property at a specific location must resort to 
common law or state law theories to obtain a full recovery.”229 
Thus, where the cause of action involves affirmative misconduct and is filed 
by a private citizen against a corporation for compensatory damages caused by an 
exacerbated natural disaster, the suit will not go beyond the province of the court 
into political matters, and as a claim for the invasion of a personal right it, “by 
definition,” will “not involve a political question.”230 
C. Causes of Action and Remedy 
Several common law theories of recovery are well-suited for the kind of claim 
a plaintiff experiencing property damage from climate change could pursue.231 
This part analyzes the more obvious ones that can apply to the Carbon Majors: 
negligence232 and nuisance.233 
1. Common Law Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur 
A prima facie case for negligence requires a showing of: (1) a duty owed to 
the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation between the 
breach and plaintiff’s harm; and (4) damages.234 For plaintiffs who suffer property 
damage as a result of exacerbated natural disasters, the damages prong will pose 
little challenge.235 However, the elements of duty, breach, and causation will 
 
Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 84 (Iowa 2014)). 
228.   Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
229.   Brown–Forman Corp. v. Miller, 528 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Ky. 2017). 
230.   ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §2.6, 149 n.7 (5th ed. 2007) (quoting HOWARD FINK 
& MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 231 (2d ed. 1987) (“[N]otice the effect of 
Marbury’s classification: Standing is just the obverse of political questions. If a litigant claims that an individual 
right has been invaded, the lawsuit by definition does not involve a political question.”)). 
231.   Grossman, supra note 12, at 59. 
232.   Infra Part V.A.1 
233.   Infra Part V.A.2. 
234.   Hon. Theodore R. Boehm, A Tangled Webb-Reexamining the Role of Duty in Indiana Negligence 
Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). 
235.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1979) (explaining that the word “harm” implies “a loss 
or detriment to a person . . . in so far as physical changes have a detrimental effect on a person, that person suffers 
harm.”).  
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require more effort to prove.236 
Establishing duty requires a showing that the type of harm suffered by the 
plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct, such that the 
defendant’s actions created an unreasonable risk of harm to that foreseeable 
plaintiff.237 In general, breaching a duty will only occur when an actor’s conduct 
is unreasonable under the circumstances, creating a foreseeable risk of harm that 
eventually materialized.238 
Thus, under a negligence theory, a hypothetical climate plaintiff would allege 
that the Carbon Majors owed her a duty to not create an unreasonable risk of 
property damage.239 In other words, this plaintiff will establish that the Carbon 
Majors risked causing her property damage by emitting high amounts of CO2 into 
the atmosphere, and that the risk was unreasonable given the circumstances.240 Of 
course, this raises the problem inherent in a tort based on climate change; 
somewhat paradoxically, the larger the scope of potential plaintiffs, the less likely 
it is that liability will attach.241 This is the relational aspect of legal duties because 
a defendant cannot be held liable for negligence solely by acting negligently.242 
That “climate” is itself global in nature (defined as “the weather conditions 
prevailing in an area in general or over a long period”) seems to inevitably lead to 
the conclusion that affecting the climate would create global risk.243 But in reality, 
there is no reason why the relational aspect of a legal duty cannot be global when 
the risk itself is.244 In fact, numerous commentators have observed that this 
“omnipresent plaintiff” problem is indeed not a problem when it comes to climate 
change and the problems that climate change will cause.245 
As for breach, there are several broad approaches to deciding whether one has 
occurred.246 Learned Hand’s classic BPL formulation provides that a breach occurs 
if the burden of preventing the harm was less than the magnitude of the potential 
 
236.   Infra Part V.A.1. 
237.   Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928). 
238.   Id. 
239.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1979). 
240.   Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) (applying the reasonable person standard as the objective 
level of care to be used in order to avoid liability for negligence).  
241.   Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99 (N.Y. 1928) (“The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation 
to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her 
it was not negligence at all.”). 
242.   Id. at 101 (“Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation.”). 
243.   Bhavya Reddy, Climate Change Is a Global Problem. Climate Action Is a Local Solution, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 07:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/05/climate-change-
global-problem-climate-action-local-solution (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
244.   Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. 
245.   See Grossman, supra note 12, at 40 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s latest decisions have enhanced 
the plaintiff’s ability in a climate tort case to establish standing); Hunter & Salzman, supra note 12, at 1757 (“The 
identifiable risks of climate change are becoming better understood, and most of them have become more likely 
with greater consequences than was thought even a decade ago.”).  
246.   Hunter & Salzman, supra note 12, at 1757. 
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harm times its likelihood of occurring.247 This approach brings in various policy 
issues surrounding the acceptable burden to place on energy producers, but any 
such burden must necessarily be juxtaposed with Carbon Majors’ annual net 
revenue and the amount it receives in subsidies.248 The United States itself spends 
approximately $20.5 billion annually on “fossil fuel exploration and production 
subsidies,”249 which does not include military costs to defend fossil fuel interests 
globally250 or the costs incurred as a result of pollution.251 All of this is not to argue 
for ending these subsidies—especially because doing so would only decrease total 
CO2 emissions by a small percentage.
252 Rather, the point is to emphasize that the 
fossil fuel companies are in the best position to uphold the burden of losses when 
it comes to environmental harm—a notion that reflects supposedly one of the 
fundamental functions of tort law.253 
The most significant counterargument in finding a breach under any method 
will be the social utility provided by the Carbon Majors.254 However, even granting 
the enormously high value of the Carbon Majors providing energy, that utility 
relates only to short-term goals (which Big Oil could achieve by alternate, less 
harmful means), and emitting gigaton after gigaton of CO2 into the atmosphere 
unequivocally has negative utility in the long run.255 
 
247.   Id.; United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s duty, as 
in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability 
that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate 
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248.   Carrington, supra note 4 (explaining that internationally, governments spend an estimated $10 million 
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fiscal, macroeconomic, and social consequences of energy subsidies.”); Id. at 6 (“Most energy subsidies arise 
from the failure to adequately charge for the cost of domestic environmental damage—only about one-quarter of 
the total is from climate change.”). 
252.   Eduardo Porter, Do Oil Companies Really Need $4 Billion Per Year of Taxpayers’ Money?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/upshot/do-oil-companies-really-need-4-billion-per-
year-of-taxpayers-money.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (referring to a report 
by the Council on Foreign Relations: “Cutting oil drilling subsidies might reduce domestic oil production by 5 
percent in the year 2030.”). 
253.   Wex: Tort, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort (last visited Jan. 2, 2018) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
254.   RICHARD S.J. TOL, UNIV. OF SUSSEX, THE PRIVATE BENEFIT OF CARBON AND ITS SOCIAL COST 
(2017), available at https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=wps-07-2017.pdf&site=24&ut 
m_content=buffera74f6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The private benefit of carbon is much higher than the social cost of 
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As for causation,  every natural disaster that is uncommon to an area should 
entail a res ipsa loquitur-style analysis, a doctrine developed at common law that 
shifts the initial burden of producing evidence of causation to the defendant based 
on the rationale that such evidence is “practically accessible to him but inaccessible 
to the injured person.”256 For the doctrine to apply: (1) the kind of injury that 
occurred must be one that “ordinarily does not occur [absent] someone’s 
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the 
exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any 
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.”257 
It was probably negligence that proximately caused property damage that 
would not have occurred were the climate not destabilized.258 The top 90 carbon 
producers in the world probably contributed substantially to that destabilization.259 
Moreover, although it is true that every person—particularly Americans—
contributes to climate change, even the relatively high consumption of fossil fuels 
by the average American is not a substantial enough amount of CO2 that could 
disrupt natural atmospheric levels the way that gigatons over decades can.260 
As such, Carbon Majors should be jointly and severally liable to any person 
whose property has been destroyed from such an abnormally intense weather 
event.261 It will then be left to the industry itself to determine its respective liability 
 
256.   See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 489; Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 170, 
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257.   Ybarra, 25 Cal.2d at 489. 
258.   See, e.g., Jin-Ho Yoon et al., Explaining Extreme Events of 2014, 96 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL 
SOC’Y 96 S5–S9 (2015) (“The fire season in northern California during 2014 was the second largest in terms of 
burned areas since 1996. An increase in fire risk in California is attributable to human-induced climate change.”); 
Neal Conan, Study Links Extreme Weather and Climate Change, NPR (Feb. 17, 2011, 2:35 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/02/17/133843546/Study-Links-Extreme-Weather-And-Climate-Change (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“In October and November of 2000, England and Wales experienced 
the wettest autumn since they started to keep records back in 1766.”); But see Cheng et al., How Has Human-
Induced Climate Change Affected California Drought Risk? (Jan. 1, 2016), https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf 
/10.1175/JCLI-D-15-0260.1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The results thus indicate 
that the net effect of climate change has made agricultural drought less likely and that the current severe impacts 
of drought on California’s agriculture have not been substantially caused by long-term climate changes.”). 
259.   See Drollette Jr., supra note 3 (explaining how just 90 entities are responsible for 63% of all industrial 
CO2 and methane emissions). 
260.   See Mapping the American carbon footprint, down to the last zip code (interactive maps), 
SRHINKTHATFOOTPRINT.COM (last visited Apr. 1, 2018), http://shrinkthatfootprint.com/american-carbon-
footprint (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
261.   See Rourk v. Selvey, 164 S.E.2d 909, 910 (S.C. 1968) (quoting Pendleton v. Columbia Ry., Gas & 
Elec. Co., 131 S.E. 265, 267 (S.C. 1926)). 
That a single injury, which is the proximate result of the separate and independent acts of negligence 
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in order to seek contribution in a given case.262 Because of the global nature of 
climate change, this determination will not always mirror the actor’s actual 
contribution. Thus, the sector should internally set automatic standards for 
apportioning damages in any given case according to the proportion of each 
companies’ respective GHG emissions.263 By imposing joint and several liability, 
a plaintiff can choose to collect damages from a larger pool of defendants, tailoring 
the choice to the particular jurisdiction and/or legal theory, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of a court exercising jurisdiction.264 
The court could also apportion these damages itself and impose market share 
liability as opposed to joint and several.265 However, the companies are better 
suited to make this determination within the industry; not only does the data 
necessary for attribution analyses come from the individual companies’ own self-
reporting,266 but these companies also tend to employ or at least have access to 
numerous highly-skilled experts who can perform in-depth attribution analyses.267 
It would also act to “smoke out”268 those defendants whose self-reported figures 
are inaccurate, for example, since the potentially enormous sums at stake would 
incentivize intra-industry investigation and other methods of ascertaining just 
apportionment. 
For areas that typically experience extreme weather, but nonetheless 
experience degrees of severity that differ from typical weather patterns had 
defendants not been negligent,269 damages can be limited. One way to limit 
 
jointly; that is, as defendants in one action, or of suing each upon his several liability in a separate 
action.  
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significant changes in the earth’s climate, including rainfall distribution and alterations in the biosphere.”). 
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damages is to ascertain the percentage by which the weather event was exacerbated 
by climate change in general, using that percentage to find the probable extent of 
damage that would have occurred had there been no negligence, and reducing the 
defendant’s liability by the difference in like damage costs.270 
2. Nuisance 
In general, there are two types of nuisance; a private nuisance is “an activity 
that substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of 
land,”271 whereas a public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public.”272 
At first glance, the theory of nuisance sounds advantageous to the potential 
plaintiff, considering the focus on the reasonability of the interference.273 
However, that aspect of the claim proved problematic for the plaintiffs in 
Connecticut v. American Electric Power, who had claimed that about “ten percent 
of all anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in the United States” was caused by 
the specific defendant utilities.274 This case was dismissed for posing a 
nonjusticiable political question275 since adjudicating the nuisance claim would 
require a judicial determination of how much CO2 constitutes an “unreasonable 
interference.” 
As such, it appears that alleging nuisance is both unworkable in the sense that 
it requires an outright judicial determination of reasonableness,276 but it is also 
unnecessary given the fact that negligence could easily achieve the same result. 
And, even though negligence also involves assessment of reasonableness, the 
reasonableness in the negligence context is relative to the level of risk created by 
 
by long-term climate changes.”). 
270.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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to the factfinder for assignment of a percentage of comparative responsibility.”). 
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273.   Id. § 821 (defining private nuisance as an “unreasonable interference” with land and a public nuisance 
as an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public”). 
274.   Complaint at 26, Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 Civ. 5669 
(LAP)). 
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the defendant and the type of injury received by the plaintiff.277 In that sense, it is 
not so much a policy determination of what level of CO2 in the atmosphere, given 
numerous economic, social, and political factors, is reasonable; rather, it is a 
common-place judicial assessment of whether the defendant’s conduct created an 
unreasonable risk to the plaintiffs.278 
V. CONCLUSION 
A cause of action rooted in common law negligence brought by private 
plaintiffs would be the most effective means of providing individuals with relief 
and deterring future misconduct. Just as Big Tobacco could no longer defend itself 
by decrying the personal responsibility of the smoker,279 Big Oil should no longer 
be able to deny, downplay, or shift the blame for global warming onto people who 
drive cars, buy commercially manufactured sneakers, or use plastic. Not only has 
it concealed the dangerous nature of these activities,280 but it has also purposefully 
confused the public using political and media bribery.281 It has rendered our system 
of government disloyal to the American people, and the planet itself. This 
emblematic coup d’état by Big Oil forecloses the normal channels of legislative 
and executive regulation, at least for the foreseeable future, and necessitates 
alternative methods of accountability by the people themselves. 
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